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Chapter 2

Business Profits (Article 7 OECD
Model Convention)
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*
Kimberly A. Clausing**

1

INTRODUCTION

The general purpose of tax treaties is to implement the consensus underlying
the international tax regime by shifting the right to tax passive income from the
source to the residence country, and by limiting the ability of source countries to
tax active income to income attributable to a permanent establishment. 1 Article 7
of the OECD MC implements this latter function by stating that a Contracting State
may not tax business profits arising therein unless they are attributable to a
permanent establishment (PE, as defined in Article 5 OECD MC).
A priori, one would expect Article 7 not to play a very important role in modern
treaty practice, because most cross-border business profits are earned by
multinational enterprises (MNEs), and MNEs generally operate in host countries
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via subsidiaries, rather than via branches. Thus, one would expect that most practical
issues in the allocation of business income would be governed by Article 9 OECD
MC, which addresses parent-subsidiary transactions, rather than by Article 7.
However, a series of recent developments have led to a renewed emphasis on
Article 7, as evidenced by the publication last year of a major OECD report on the
attribution of profits to permanent establishments.2 These developments include
the rise of electronic commerce, which has made it easier to sell products into
countries without using a subsidiary or a PE; the increasing importance of financial
services and global trading, which is frequently conducted via branches; and the
proliferation of tax planning using PE structures, such as US planning relying on
check the box. In addition, various countries have taken aggressive approaches to
finding that a PE exists, such as recent cases that find that a subsidiary is in fact
a dependent agent PE. 3
In reaction to these developments, the OECD Report advocates an 'authorized
OECD approach' to the interpretation of Article 7, which incorporates by analogy
the concepts developed under Article 9 and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines:
[T]he authorized OECD approach is that the profits to be attributed to are the
profits that the PE would have earned at arm's length if it were a legally
distinct and separate enterprise performing the same or similar functions
under the same or similar conditions, determined by applying the arm's length
principle under Article 7(2). 4
As Richard Vann has pointed out, the problem with this approach is that it assumes
that the Article 9/Transfer Pricing Guidelines are working well, and therefore
treating PEs as if they were subsidiaries would solve the problem. 5 However, an
extensive literature has established that the Transfer Pricing Guidelines are not
working well, and are in need of reform. 6 Thus, we believe that the Article 7
problem must be reconsidered from first principles.
2

WHAT IS THE RIGHT WAY TO TAX MNEs
AT SOURCE?

The OECD Report states that its recommendation 'was not constrained by either
the original intent or by the historical practice and interpretation of Article 7'. 7
2. OECD, Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (December 2006),
(hereafter, the 'OECD Report').
3. LeGall, 'When Is a Subsidiary a Permanent Establishment of Its Parent?' Tillinghast Lecture,
New York University (2006), (forthcoming in Tax Law Review).
4. OECD Report, 12.
5. Vann, Problems in the International Division of the Business Income Tax Base (2007); Vann,
'Tax Treaties: The Secret Agent's Secrets', British Tax Review 345 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, 'The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of
U.S. International Taxation', Virginia Tax Review 15 (1995): 89; updated version in Finance
and Tax Law Review 9 (2006): 310.
7. OECD Report, 8.
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Moreover, the report recommends a redrafting of both the article itself and the
commentary. 8 Given this, it seems appropriate to begin by asking: If we were
working on a clean slate, what would be the best way to tax MNEs at source in
the light of 21st century business practices?
The beginning point has to be that a modem MNE does not operate as if its
constituent units, either subsidiaries or branches, deal with each other as if they
were separate enterprises. Instead, a modem MNE is generally a single, unified
enterprise, managed from a central location by managers who are responsible to
their shareholders for the results of the MNE as a whole.
The current approach to taxing MNEs at source is based on separate accounting (SA), or treating each entity within the MNE as a separate taxpayer. This
approach is problematic for a variety of reasons. First, the system is not suited
to the global nature of international business. In particular, international production
processes make the SA system of assigning profit to specific geographic destinations inherently arbitrary. Further, the very nature of multinational firm operations
generates additional profit over what would occur with strictly arm's-length transactions between unaffiliated entities. Theories of multinational firms emphasize
that they arise in part due to organizational and internalization advantages relative
to purely domestic firms; such advantages imply that profit is generated in part by
internalizing transactions within the firm. Thus, with firms that are truly integrated
across borders, holding related entities to an 'arm's-length' standard for the pricing
of intra-company transactions does not make sense, nor does allocating income and
expenses on a country-by-country basis.
Also, the current system is based on an artificial distinction among legal
entities. For example, companies are taxed differently based on whether they
employ subsidiaries or branches; as one example, deferral of taxation on unrepatriated profits is allowed for the former but not the later. Recently, there has been an
increasingly common use of hybrid entities (treated as subsidiaries by one country
and branches by another) to achieve double non-taxation.
Another related problem is that the current system is based on an increasingly
artificial distinction between MNEs whose parent is incorporated in a residence
country and those whose parent is incorporated elsewhere. The former, but not the
latter, are frequently subject to world-wide taxation with its attendant complexities
(primarily the foreign tax credit and CFC rules). But in today's world, this distinction is less and less meaningful as the sources of capital, location of research
and development (R&D), location of production, and location of distribution of
MNEs become increasingly globalized. The current distinction has led to a spate
of inversion transactions, in which US-based MNEs formally shift the location of
incorporation of their parent offshore without changing the location of any of their
real business activities.
Second, the current system of international taxation creates an artificial tax
incentive to locate profits in low-tax countries, both by locating real economic

8. OECD Report, 9.
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activities in such countries and by shifting profits toward more lightly taxed locations. It is apparent that US multinational firms, for example, book disproportionate amounts of profit in low-tax locations. Figure 1 shows the top ten profit
locations for US multinational firms in 2003, based on the share of worldwide
(non-US) profits earned in each location. While some of the countries are places
with a large US presence in terms of economic activity (the United Kingdom,
Canada, Germany, Japan), seven of the top-ten profit countries are locations
with very low effective tax rates.
The literature has consistently found that multinational firms are sensitive
to corporate tax rate differences across countries in their financial decisions.
Estimates from the literature suggest that the tax base responds to changes in
the corporate tax rate with an average semi-elasticity of about - 2; thus, countries
with high corporate tax rates are likely to gain revenue by lowering their tax rate. 9
One recent study suggests that corporate income tax revenues in the United States
were approximately 35% lower due to income shifting in 2002. 10
Third, the current system is absurdly complex. As Taylor notes, observers
have described the system as 'a cumbersome creation of stupefying complexity'
with 'rules that lack coherence and often work at cross purposes'. 11 Altshuler and
Ackerman note that observers testifying before the President's Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform found the system 'deeply, deeply flawed', noting that 'It is
difficult to overstate the crisis in the administration of the international tax system
of the United States' .12
A large part of this crisis results from applying the current Transfer Pricing
Guidelines. The current regime consumes a disproportionate share of both IRS and
private sector resources. For example, several recent Ernst and Young surveys of
multinational firms have concluded that 'transfer pricing continues to be, and will
remain, the most important international tax issue facing MNEs' .13 Seventy per
cent of their respondents feel that transfer pricing documentation has become more
important in recent years, and 63 % of respondents report transfer pricing audit
activity in the previous three years.
Opinions in transfer pricing cases run to hundreds of pages each, and litigation
involves billions of dollars in proposed deficiencies, such as the recently settled
Glaxo case (9 billion dollars [USO] in proposed deficiency, settled for USO 3.4
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

See de Mooij, 'Will Corporate Income Taxation Survive?' De Economist 153 (2005): 277, for
an overview of this literature.
This estimate is from Clausing, 'Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and U.S. Government
Revenue' (2007), working paper. The calculation is based on a regression of US multinational
firm affiliate profit rates on tax rate differences across countries.
Taylor, Testimony before the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, 31 March
2005; Tax Notes (4 April 2005), Doc. 2005-6654.
·
Altshuler/Ackerman, 'International Aspects of Recommendations from the President's
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform', International Tax Policy Forum Presentation
(2 December 2005).
Ernst and Young, '2005-2006 Global Transfer Pricing Surveys'. Available on-line at
<www.ey.com/transferpricingsurvey>, accessed 4 Jan 2007.
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billion) or the Aramco advantage case (litigated and lost by the Internal Revenue
Service, which asserted deficiencies of over USD 9 billion). There is no indication
that the 1994 regulations under IRC section 482 have abated this trend. 14 While
there have been fewer decided cases than under the pre-1994 regulations, this is
because both taxpayers and the IRS have been devoting enormous resources to
settling these controversies in the appeals process, in litigation or through advance
pricing agreements, while both sides have been wary of losing a major court case.
The contemporaneous documentation rule adopted by Congress, which
requires taxpayers to develop documentation of their transfer pricing methods at
the time the transactions are undertaken rather than when they are challenged on
audit, as well as the complexity of the new SA methods (such as the Comparable
Profits Method, or CPM), have led the major accounting firms to develop huge
databases and expertise in preparing transfer pricing documentation for clients.
This imposes large costs on major US multinational corporations. 15 Meanwhile,
small and medium businesses, which cannot afford the major accounting firms, are
left to fend for themselves and are frequently targeted for audits in which the IRS
can employ more sophisticated methods than the taxpayer because only the IRS
and the large accounting firms have the necessary data to apply CPM. Thus, while
the IRS continues to lose transfer prices cases against major MNEs under the 1994
regulations (for example, Xilinx) or has to settle for less than half the proposed
deficiency in Glaxo, it is able to win cases against small and medium firms on
the basis of superior resources, rather than greater substantive justification of its
position.
Thus, we believe that if we were designing the system from scratch, we would
adopt as our starting point not SA, but formulary apportionment (FA). FA has
several advantages over SA. First, FA aligns the international corporate tax system
with the reality of a truly global world economy. In a world where most major
corporations are MNEs, where 70% of US international trade is done by
multinational firms, and where many opportunities for tax avoidance have an
international dimension, the current system of corporate taxation is obsolete. In
particular, SA systems treat each affiliate of a multinational firm as a distinct entity
with its own costs and incomes. Allocating income and expenses across countries
is both complex and conceptually unsatisfactory, given that worldwide income is
generated by interactions between affiliates across countries. Multinational firms
exist in large part because these interactions generate more income than would
separate domestic firms interacting at arms-length; thus, requiring firms to allocate
this additional income among domestic tax bases is necessarily artificial and
arbitrary, because it would by definition disappear if the related entities operated
at arm's length. Further, such allocation generates ample opportunity for
multinational firms to reduce worldwide tax burdens by shifting income to
more lightly taxed jurisdictions.
14. Avi-Yonah, Finance and Tax Law Review (2006): 310.
15. Durst/Culbertson, 'Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today', Tax Law Review 57 (2003): 37.
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Under an FA system, tax liabilities are instead based on a multinational firm's
global income, and the share that is taxed by the national jurisdiction depends on
the fraction of a firm's economic activity that occurs in a particular country. 16
Thus, while a truly precise definition and measurement of economic value is likely
unattainable, FA provides a reasonable, administrable, and conceptually satisfying
compromise that suits the nature of the global economy. Further, a FA system
does not create an artificial legal distinction among types of firms, and whether
multinational entities are organized as subsidiaries, branches, or hybrid entities.
Nor does an FA system rely on an artificial distinction between MNEs whose
parent is incorporated in a particular residence jurisdiction and MNEs whose
parent is incorporated elsewhere.
The second advantage associated with the proposal is that it eliminates the tax
incentive to shift income to low-tax countries. As income shifting incentives are an
important part of the overall tax incentive for locating operations in low-tax
countries, removing this incentive will also result in less tax-distorted decisions
regarding the location of economic activity. Under FA, firms are taxed based on
their global income. Thus, accounting for the income earned in each country is no
longer necessary, and there is no way to lighten global tax burdens by manipulating
this accounting for tax purposes.
Under FA, there is no reason for the sort of profit distortions that are so clearly
visible in Figure 1. In addition, when firms consider the tax advantages associated
with operating in low-tax countries, these advantages will be based simply on the
lower tax associated with their operations in such countries, rather than additional
advantages conferred due to the fact that real operations in low-tax countries
facilitate tax avoidance. Thus, the adoption of FA should vastly reduce tax distortions to multinational firm decision making.
Such changes in the taxation of international income ultimately help governments set their tax policies more independently. The wishes of voters in each
government influence the ideal size of government, required revenue needs, and
the allocation of the tax burden among subgroups within society. Under FA, governments would be able to choose their own corporate tax rate based on their
assessment of these sorts of policy goals, rather than the pressures of tax competition for an increasingly mobile capital income tax base.
The third advantage associated with the proposal is the massive increase in
simplicity that this would enable for the international tax system. To determine tax
liability, there would be no need to allocate income or expenses among countries,
resulting in far lighter compliance burden for firms. CFC rules and the foreign tax
credit, which are both hugely complicated and a major source of transaction costs
for MNEs, are no longer necessary, since there is no deferral under this system
(which is essentially territorial and treats all MNEs alike).

16. How this fraction is determined depends on the formula, discussed below.
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Figure 1: Where Were the Profits in 2003?
(profits as a percentage of the worldwide total)

12.0%
10.0%
8.0%
6.0%
4.0%
2.0%
0.0%

Country
Netherlands
Ireland
Bermuda
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
Canada
Switzerland
Germany
U .K. Islands
Japan

Effective Tax Rate

5.3%
6.1%
1.7%
20.1%
-1.8%
23.5%
4.5%
8.2%
1.3%
36.9%

Notes: In 2003, majority-owned affiliates of US multinational firms earned USD 326 billion of net
income. This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-US) total net income occurring in each
of the top-ten income countries. Thus, each percentage point translates into approximately USD 3.3
billion of net income. Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign income taxes paid relative to net
(pre-tax) income. Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web page; 2003 is the most
recent year with revised data available. The Bureau of Economic Analysis conducts annual surveys of
Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates.
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Further, the likely administrative savings from abandoning the current cumbersome transfer pricing regime are huge. By contrast to the current regime, FA is
relatively simple since all that it requires is:
(1) establishing which businesses are unitary and

(2) establishing destination of arm's-length sales of goods or services. 17

Once these two elements are established, the resulting formula permits both taxpayers and the tax authorities to determine to correct tax liability to each jurisdiction that uses FA. This means that there is no longer a need to allocate or apportion
expenses (a source of major complexity in the current rules, as the US 861 regulations indicate), because all a business needs is to calculate its world-wide net
income (worldwide gross income minus worldwide expenses). This net income
is then allocated to various jurisdictions based on a single formula, the tax rate of
each jurisdiction is applied to the allocated income, and the tax is paid.
For small and medium businesses in particular, FA results in major cost savings as well as the likelihood of paying less tax (since such businesses are rarely
in a position to take on the IRS under SA). For major multinational firms, FA also
offers the prospect of avoiding the costs of contemporaneous documentation, and
while some firms may pay more tax than under SA, many would welcome the
opportunity of paying a single, low rate to each jurisdiction they do business in
(especially if the adoption of FA is coupled with a reduction in the corporate rate),
instead of having to cope with the complexities and costs of SA.
3

PROGRESS TOWARD FA, 1995-2007

But, it will be argued right away, we are not working on a clean slate: SA is the
international norm, and FA is anathema to the OECD. Thus, we must work within
the confines of SA, whatever its disadvantages.
But is this really still true? We would argue that developments since the
adoption of the revised Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 1995 have made a consensual shift to FA much more likely.
First, one needs to recognize that the Transfer Pricing Guidelines themselves
represent a crucial step forward because they adopt two methods (TNMM and
profit split) that are not based on strictly defined comparables. As we have argued
elsewhere, once strict comparability is abandoned, the term 'arm's length' can be
applied to any transfer pricing method, including FA. 18 That is because in the
absence of comparables, no one can know what unrelated parties would have
done, and thus any result is an arm's length result. Thus, as stated in 1993 by
senior officials of the United States Treasury, the United Kingdom Inland
17. For a specific statutory proposal on how to deal with these issues in the context of a sales-based
formula see Durst, 'A Statutory Proposal for U.S. Transfer Pricing Reform', Tax Notes Int'/
(2007): 1041.
18. Avi-Yonah, Virginia Tax Rev. (1995).
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Revenue, the Fiscal Affairs Division of the OECD and the Japanese National Tax
Administration:
[T]he arm's length principle and formulary apportionment should not be seen
as polar extremes; rather, they should be viewed as part of a continuum of
methods ranging from CUP to predetermined formulas. It is not clear where
the arm's length principle ceases and formulary apportionment begins, and
it is counterproductive and unimportant to attempt to apply labels to the
methods. 19
Second, recent developments in the EU (which now represents a majority in the
OECD) have cast doubt about the opposition of certain traditional opponents of FA
to that method. In particular, the work on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base (CCCTB), which is scheduled to lead to a concrete proposal by 2010, is based
on FA. 20 Of course, the CCCTB proposal faces difficult political obstacles, is only
intended to apply within the EU, and is currently voluntary. However, the work so
far shows that a significant portion of EU Member States, including some traditional opponents of FA like Germany, now believe that FA is the direction of future
development.
Third, the US has been at the forefront of adopting formulary methods, both in
the context of allocating expenses (for example, the interest allocation regulations)
and income (for example, the global trading regulations). Moreover, the US
approach to transfer pricing has since 1995 been closer in practice to FA (the
CPM is more formulary than TNMM, and the US profit split is equivalent in
practice to FA with the location of R&D determining the formula). Recent policy
work by the Hamilton Project, the major Democratic think tank for the 2008
election, has supported FA, which has gained adherents such as former Treasury
Secretaries Robert Rubin and Larry Summers. 21
Thus, we believe that if the OECD were to shift course and start working on an
FA proposal for Article 7, this could have the support of both the US and a large
number of EU members. That is particularly true if the proposal could be implemented within the existing language of Article 7.

4

IS FA COMPATIBLE WITH THE OECD MODEL
CONVENTION?

Some have argued that tax treaties will need modification with adoption of FA.
However, it is not clear to us that existing tax treaties will have to be renegotiated.
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which assumes
19. Arnold/McDonnell, 'Report on the Invitational Conference on Transfer Pricing: the Allocation
of Income and Expenses among Countries', Tax Notes (1993): 1377.
20. European Commission, 'The Mechanism for Sharing the CCCTB,'< CCCTB/WP/047/doc/en>
(2006); Spengel, The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (2007).
21. See Avi-Yonah/Clausing, The Hamilton Project (2007).
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the SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial relations between
associated enterprises. If FA were adopted, Article 9 would become irrelevant in
those situations to which FA applies (that is where a unitary business is found to
exist) because FA ignores the transactions between related parties, and treats them
instead as part of a single enterprise.
Instead, FA would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7):
The fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting State controls or
is controlled by a company that is a resident of the other Contracting
State ... shall not constitute either company a permanent establishment of
the other.
However, it is well established that a dependent agent can be a permanent establishment (see Article 5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent is based on whether
the principal exercises legal and economic control over the agent:
An agent that is subject to detailed instructions regarding the conduct of
its operations or comprehensive control by the enterprise is not legally
independent. 22
In the case of a modem, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary business, a
strong argument can be made that the parent of the MNE exercises both legal and
economic control over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the
subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss and acquire goods and services exclusively
or near exclusively from the parent or other related corporations. In that case, the
subsidiaries should be regarded as dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is
in fact made with increasing frequency in both developed and developing
countries. 23
If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Article 7(2) of the treaties requires
the attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary:

that it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar
conditions.
Arguably, the application of FA satisfies this arm's length condition because in the
absence of precise comparables (which almost never exist) it is not possible
to determine exactly what profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary
under SA.
When the US adopted CPM and profit split in the 1994 transfer pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating the treaties because these
methods did not rely on exact comparables to find the arm's length price. However,
these objections soon subsided, and even the OECD endorsed similar methods in
its transfer pricing guidelines. The US always maintained that both CPM and profit
22. U.S. Treasury, Technical Explanation of United States Model Income Tax Convention,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006) Art. 5(6).
23. LeGall, Tillinghast Lecture (2006).
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split satisfy the arm's length standard despite the lack of precise comparables (and
in the case of profit split, using no comparables at all to allocate any residual
profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the 'super-royalty rule' of IRC
section 482 (which requires royalties to be 'commensurate with the income'
from an intangible, and therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent
with the arm's length standard, even though no comparables can be found to
show that such adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties.
In addition, if OECD members were to adopt FA, they could argue that this is
compatible with the language of OECD MC Article 7(4):
Insofar as it haS'been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits
to be attributed to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment
of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2
shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of apportionment
adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the
principles contained in this Article.
This language is found in many existing tax treaties based on the OECD and UN
models, and it can be used by OECD members as a basis for applying FA under
their domestic law, without resort to a treaty override.
5

CONCLUSION: TOW ARD A NEW MECHANISM FOR
TAXING BUSINESS PROFITS AT SOURCE

We thus believe that rather than finalizing the current OECD Report, the OECD
should abandon its effort to apply obsolete Article 9 SA concepts to PEs. Instead, it
should work on designing a workable FA approach within the context of current
Article 7. Article 9 can be left to apply only to those situations in which a business
is not unitary.
Adopting FA requires resolution of difficult issues. First, the OECD would
need to define a unitary business. We believe that relying on the current treaty
language of legal and economic dependency, plus a test based on control (>50%
of vote or value) and a de minimis threshold of related party transactions would be
adequate in most cases.
Second, the common tax base to be apportioned needs to be agreed on. The EU
work on the CCCTB and progress toward international adoption of IFRS both can
help in this regard.
Third and most importantly, the formula needs to be determined. We have
advocated a sales-based formula because of the likelihood that countries can adopt
it without coordination, like destination basis for VAT. 24 Sales are also less susceptible to tax-motivated shifting than assets or payroll (the other elements in the

24. See Avi-Yonah/Clausing, The Hamilton Project (2007).
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traditional US state formula). But within the OECD there is scope for negotiations
on other formulas, including functional analysis based on personnel, assets and
sales (as in the global trading regulations and the OECD Report).
Finally, we believe that in the future the text of Article 5 needs to be revamped
so that it fits modem business realities. In particular, we would advocate a numerical threshold, rather than one based on a physical PE. 25 But that is a topic for
another day.

25. See Avi-Yonah, 'International Taxation of Electronic Commerce', Tax Law Review 52 ( 1997),
507; Arnold, 'Threshold Requirements for Taxing Profits under Tax Treaties', in The Taxation
of Business Profits under Tax Treaties, eds Amold/Sasseville/Zolt (2003); Pinto, 'The Need to
Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold', Bulletin for Int'! Taxation 60
(2006): 206.

